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INTRODUCTION 
The problem of causality in external sensation has been one that 
has caused philosophers much ~fficulty since it involves the knotty 
problem of the interaction of matter and spirit. Obviously, it •ould 
seem, no mtre material body can cause a change in a simple spiritual 
entity like Dl8l'l' s soul. Yet the psychic state that is an essential 
part of sensation seems to be an affection ot such a simple soul, and 
likewise seems to be caused by the material objects around man. This 
problem has been aggravated for those philosophers who emphasize the 
dualim of matter and spirit, and, fearful lest they confuse the t•o 
in man, so widen the gap bet•een body and soul that they insulate the 
soul completely from the causal influx of the body. 
It is the purpose of the present paper to show the solution which 
one thinker, St. Albert the Great, proposed to solve the problem of 
causality in sensation. From an investigation of St • .Albert• s writings 
•e shall describe his theory of causality in external sensation and at-
tempt to determine how successfully his explanation solved the basic 
problems of this causality. 
The order of procedure w:lll be simple. We shall begin with a 
brief sketch ot the history of causality in sensation from Plato and 
Aristotle to st. Albert. This nll comprise the first chapter. The 
second chapter will contain a short delineation of the notions basic 
to st. Albert's explanation and a S\1DIIII8.rf of some important terminology. 
1 
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The third chapter, which is the heart of the thesis, will contain an 
exposition of Albert's explanation of sensation and show what he con-
tributed to the scholastic theory as he found it. '!he four'tltand last 
chapter will comprise a critical evaluation of St. Albert's explanation 
in the light of the complete and scholastic theory, especially as pro-
posed by his famous pupil, Thomas J.quinas. With such an exemi nation we 
shall have completed our attempt to solve the fundamental problem of this 
thesisa What. was the specific contribution of st. Albert the Great to 
the scholastic doctrine of causality in external sensation. 
HISTORY OF THB: QUESTION 
It was Plato who advanced the first theory of sensation that was 
of major importance. He saw the real nature of sensatiOD and set out 
to explain its workings. According to Plutarch, Plato characterized 
sensation as "a communion of soul and body in relation to external ob-
jects.•l In the Philebus Plato gives a description of sensation wbieh, 
understood correctly, could almost be used by a scholastic philosopher. 
He sayss2 
Suppose some of the affections which are 
in the body from moment to moment exhaust 
themselves in the body alone, before---or 
without---reaching the soul, thus leaving 
the latter unaffected; While others pass 
through both aid impress on both a sort 
of tremor of quite a peculiar kind, in 
which both body and soul participate. ••• 
When both body and soul in this way par-
take of the co11111on affection, and ar6 
moved by this cODJDlOil movement, if you 
call this sensation, you would speak 
quite correctly. 
But while we can accept Plato's description we cannot accept it 
as he meant it. For Plato's cosmology could never be a basis for a 
scholastic theory of cognition, since the author of the dialogues did 
not give the same objective existence to the external material world 
1 J. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition !!:!!! Alcmaeon !,2 
Aristotle, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1906, 210. Beare quotes froa 
Plut., Epit., iv, 8; Diels, »ox., 344. 
2 ~·f cf. Philebus, 33d-34a 
3 
that we do. The sensible world was for him variously participation, 
community, and imitation of the only reality, the ideas.3 The sensi-
ble objects are between the reality of the forms and the nothingness 
of not-being. They are a sort of becoming or motion.4 What is more, 
the sensible objects exist only when they are being sensed. Plato 
states this very clearly in the Theaetetus&5 
And yet, when I become percipient, I must 
necessarily become percipient of something, 
!or it is impossible to become percipient 
and perceive nothing; and that which is 
perceived must become so to someone, when 
it becomes sweet or bitter or the like; for 
to become sweet, but sweet to no one is im-
possible.... The result, then is that we 
are bound to one another; and so if a man 
says anything "is", he must say it is to 
or of or in relation to something ••• 
This emphasis on the relativism of sensation led Plato to a sub-
jectiTism that vitiated his doctrine of sensation. Plato found himself 
trimming down the reality of the external world, until in the Republic 
he made sensible objects shadGws of images of men, animals, and other 
things---shadows twice removed from reality.6 
3 cf. A. E. Taylor, Plato--The I!!! !!!! !!!!. !2£!, Dial Press, New York, 
1936, 188; also Phaedo lOOd, "I hold that nothing else makes it 
beautiful but the presence or communion ••• of absolute Jaeauty." 
(trans. by H. N. Fowler in Loeb C1assica1 Library, Wm. Heinemann, 
London, 1925, I, 345); alae Parmenides, l32d, "I think that the most 
likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns and 
that other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their 
participation in ideas is assimilation to them, that and nothing 
else." (trans. by H. N. Fowler in Loeb Classical Libra.ry, Wm. 
Heinemann, London, ~928, VI, 219-221) 
4 
4 J. Burnet, Greek PhilosGpby, Part ! Thales to Plato, Jlacmillan, London, 
1924, 240J cf. Theaetetus, l56d-l57a 
5 Theaetetus, Sophist, trans. by H. N. Fowler, HeiDemann, Lendon, 1928, 71 
6 Republic, vii, 514d 
Despite this theory of being, Plato's explanation of sensation had 
many :Weights that, iD other hands, would lead to a fuller explanation 
ef sensation. Plato held five external senses which were exercised 
through the instrumentality of sense organa'---an instrumentality that 
is not explained. He also postulated a common sense which was for him 
an activity of the soul aJ.one. 8 
Plato also decided that all the sensibles except those of sight 
act directly on the sense organs. In sight alone a medium is needed 
because only in sight does the absence of a third thing---light---
prevent senaation.9 In hearing and the other senses the active 
motion of the body and the passive motion of the sense interact 
without rmy o~aille help. In sight, however, light is needed for 
sight takes place only When the fire streaming from the eye and the 
fire which is the color of the object, (Ple.to held the four elements}, 
cooperate with the support and substantiation of the fire of daylight 
in the air.lO 
The causality involved in these operations is extremely obscure. 
Sometime& it seems that the object and the sense, (in sight the medium, 
7 Burnet, ~Philosophy, I, 246; cf. Theaetetus,l84c 
8 ~., 247; cf. Theaetetus, 185b-o 
9 Beare, 48; ct. Republic, vi, 507d, "Though vision may be in the eyes 
and ita possessor may try to use it, and though colour be present, 
5 
yet without the presence of a third thing specifically and naturally 
adapted to this purplae, you are a-.re that vision will see nothing 
and the colours will remain invisible... The thing ••• you call light." 
(trans. by P. Shorey in~ ClassicalLibrary, Wra. Beineaum, London, 
1930, II, 99) 
10 cf. Timaeus, 45b-46a (trans. by R. Bury in Loeb ClassicaJ. Library, 
Wm. Heinemann, London, 1929, 101-103) 
too), have efficient action.ll At other times the passive motion 
which Plato ascribes to the sense seems to be passive potency as 
conceived by Aristotle.12 Frankly it is impossible to decide pre-
cisely what causality each factor exercises. 
Plate has given us notions that will lead to a fuller expl&.l'lation 
of the sensitive process, but he himself has muddled the question 
very badly. Had he followed out his metaphysical doctrine of sub-
silt.nt ideas he would have become an idealist and reJected sensation 
entirely. However, he did not become an idealist and tried unsuccess-
fully to solve the puzzle of sensation. 
The Platonic trend none the less was definitely towards idealism. 
Whether this trend would have carried on to a fully developed idealism 
is anybody' a guess._ In the actual course of events Aristotle came along 
combining speculative genius with empirical hard-headedness. He de• 
cided to base his philosophy on physical reality and not on abstract 
idea.s. Plato had started with abstraction and succeeded in his attempt 
to reach reality only at the expense of consistency. Aristotle would 
take the opposite course and try to teach abstraction from reality. 
11 ct. Timaeus, 44a, "And whenever external sensations in their move-
ments collide with these revolutions and sweep along with them also 
the whole vessel ot the Soul, t'hen the revolutions, though actually 
mastered, seem to have mastery." (Loeb, 97) 
12 ct. Theaetetus, 156a-156d, • ••• there are two kinds of motion ••• and 
of these one has an active, the other a passive force. From the 
union and friction of these twe are born ••• the object of sense and 
the sense ••• tbe eye and some appropriate obJect beget whiteness and 
the corresponding perception ••• " (Loeb, 67) 
The physical world for the Stagirite was composed of universal natures 
individualized and embodied in matter.13 The universal, as universal, 
exists only in the minda outside us are only singulars. 
The bodies of this physical universe are composed of matter and 
form, potential and actual principles. Jratter is inert, a substratWD 
7 
actualized by the form. Forms are substantial and accidental, giving 
esse simpliciter and esse tale respectively.14 It is the accidental 
forma that are the proper object of sense cognitiOR.l5 T.hesi qualities 
are capable of an operation that impresses a lika111 of their forms 
on the sinses designed to receive them.16 This perception is called 
the apprehension of forms without the matter, because, since the matter 
of the object known is inert, it cannot activate a perception of itself 
in the sense.l7 
13 W.D.Ross, Aristotle, Methuen, London, 1937, 158; ct. MetAQhYsics, 
VI, 16, 1040, b 27a "It is evident then that no universals exist 
over and above the individual objects and separate from them." 
(trans. in 0-.Bakewell, Source ~~Ancient PhilosophY, Scrib-
ners, New York, 1907, 224) 
14 ~ •• 165-166 
15 E.Zeller, Aristotle !!!!! lh! Barlier feripatetics, trans. by B. 
Costelloe and J .Jmirhead, Longmans, London, 189'7, II, 60; also 
W.HBJSond, Aristotle' 8 fSYchology, S11&ll, London, 1902, XXXV* cf •, 
II De A!•• 418a, "To the objects of sense, strictly regarded, be-
long such properties as ari peculiarly and properly sense qualities, 
and it is with these that the essential nature of each sense is 
naturally concerned." (trans. in Hammond, 70) 
16 Zeller, !.2g_. ill•J of. n DeAn., 424a, "In reference to sensation 
in general we must understand that a sense is capable of receiving 
into itself sensible forms without their matter, just as wax receives 
into itself the mark o£ a ring without its iron or gold." (Hamrnond, 93) 
17 ibid. 
a 
These forms, however, are not known apart from the conditions of 
matter because sensation is an act of the composite subject of matter 
and form, and not a spiritual activity of the soul alone.l8 The sentient 
subject receives the form of the object into a corporeal organ, but 
form does not have the same mode of existence in the sense that it did 
in the object.l9 
In Aristotle's explanation the object is the cause of sensation. 
The sensible object causes a qualitative change in the •en••~ the sense, 
having received this change, is said to have actual sensation. 20 This 
reception, however, is not a mere passive taking on of a new form; the 
sense seems to have some kind of immanent operation.2l Aristotle is 
not clear on this point, yet he does seem to have held the activity 
of the sense that his scholastic followers professed. We are not told 
the exact nature of this operation of the sense. 
As we shall see later, Aristotle's explanation of sensation is 
the scholastic explanation. The scholastics filled in the details 
and made distinctions that Aristotle may or -.y not have thought of. 
Their doctrine is, in any event, the logical development of the Stagi-
18 P.Siwek, S.J., J&. fsychophysiaue Hnmf4ipe, D' A,pres .Aristote, Alcan, 
Paris, 1930, 94f cf. ! ~ AR·• 403a, "In·most casee the soul ap-
parently neither acts.nor is acted upon independently of the body, 
e.g. in the feelings of anger, courage, desire, or in a word, in 
sense perception." (Hammond, 6) 
19 ~., 107; cf. !! ~ A!•• 424a, "It (the organ of sense) has an 
identity with the object that makes the impression, but in its 
mode of expression it is different." (Hammond, 92) 
20 Zeller, II, 60 
21 ~., 59, n.3 
rite• s explanation. .Aristqtle did most of the work, the scholastics 
picked up Where he left off. 
9 
The next philosopher of name to come to grips with the problem (£ 
sensation was Piotinus. An investigation of sensation was a part of 
his rehabilitation and development of Platonism. It is no easy task, 
ho'll8ver, to discover precisely what PlotiDus held. He says that sensi-
ble reality is merely phenomenal, devoid of true reality.22 Just what 
he means· by this is not clear. He seems to say that souls create 
bodies for themselves and give them an "image of 16."23 U'berweg says 
it is a reality at most analogous with the reality of the spiritual 
world.24 
According to Plotinus the soul is in the body as a pilot in a ship 
and so has its own activities, some apart from tne body and some in the 
22 cf. bneads, I, a, 3, '13dJ Plotinus calls sensible reality non-
being, explaining it, -By not-being I do not mean absolute non• 
existence, but only What is different from real existence. Nor 
do I mean not-being in the sense that motion and rest ••• are not-
being, but rather in the sense of an image of real existence or 
of something which U.s even less existence than an image." (trans. 
by Bakewell, .22• g.!!., 3'15} "What I am alluding to is the phenomenal 
universe and all the affections of the sensible world." (Bake-
well, 375} 
23 ct. Knneade, Iv, 3, 10, "But soul by the power of essence has 
dominion over bodies in such a way that they are generated and 
subsist just as she leads them ••• For that which it (soul} imparts 
to body is an image of life." (trans. by T.t'tlylor in Sci ect 12£!! 
of Plotinus, George Bell, London, 1895, 220} · 
24 F. Uberweg, Historx of Philosophy from Thales !.2 1!!!, Present ~' 
trans. by G. Morris, Scribner's, New York, 1896, I, 70. 
10 
body.25 Sensation is an activity of the soul in the body.26. Plotinus 
does not mention the active and passive motion of Plato, rather he 
speaks of the activity of the soul working through the instrumentality 
27 
of the body. Nowhere does he allow any real causal influence to 
the object in actual sensation. There is a certain passivity of body28 
but perception is an activity of the soul.29 Clearly the causality 
for Plotinus lies in the subject and not in the object. 
After Plotinus St. Augustine came upon the philosophical scene to 
build a Christian philosophy. In his work the bishop of Hippo used 
as much of the Neo-~tonist explanations as he could. In fact he 
used so much of their material, and especially their terminology, 
that some critics haTe doubted whether he did more than put a Christian 
veneer on a thoroughly pagan piece of philosophical furniture. 30 It is 
now generally accepted, however, that st. Augustine reworked Neo-Platon• 
25 ct. Enneads, IV, 3, 21, " ••• the soul is said to be in the body in 
such a way as thepilot in a ship ..... (Tayler, 23'1) and " ••• there 
is something of the soul in which the body is conts.ined, and also 
something in which there is nothing of body; meaning by the latter 
those powers of the soul of which the body is not indigent." 
(Taylor, 238) 
26 ~., " ••• the sensitive power is present in the whole of the 
sentient organs." ( 'l'a.ylor, 238) 
27 ibid., 23, ~or in order to effect this perception the whole body is 
present as an instrument with the soul." ('l'a.ylor, 238) 
28 ~., 26, " ••• the soul must receive the judgment arising from the 
passion of the body." (Taylor, 243) 
29 Plotinus speaks of the soul "directing its attention" (Enneads, IY, 
3, 3; Taylor, 209) and of intellect "comprehending all things as 
genus comprehends species." (Enneads, V, 11, 6; Tayler, 189) 
30 K.P .Garvey, St. Augustine a Christian !!!: Heo-Plat onist 7, »arquette 
University Press, Milwaukee, 1939, 3•14 
ism in a completely Christian spirit, retaining only so much of it as 
fitted in with Christian teaching.3l 
ll 
For Augustine sensation is a true knowledge of corporeal reality 
at which we arrive through a process shared by both the soul and the 
body. 32 Following Flotinus, Augustine makes the proper act of sensa-
tion, (the actual perception), an activity of the soul alone and gives 
the body a merely passive role. 33 In this passive role the body ex-
ercises no causality on the soul but only receives images of external 
objects which the soul then peroeives.34 Augustine refused to allow 
the body any causal action on the soul because he held it as funda-
mental that no lower nature could effect anything in a higher nat\lre. 35 
st. Augustine gives a sketchy treatment of sensation that is the 
31 ibid., 239-240 
32 De Quantitate Animae, xxiii, 41, "Sensum puto esse non latere 
animam quod patitur corpus;" and De Trinitate, IX, xii, 18, 
"Liquido tenendum est quod omnis res quamcumque coilloscimus, con-
generat in nobis notitiam sui. Ab utroque enim cognitio paritulP, 
a cognoscente et cognito." (Cf. L. Keeler, S.J., Sancti Augustini 
Doctriu de Cognitione, Apud Aedes Pont. Univ. Gregorianae, Rome, 
1934, 18) 
33 De JIU.sica, VI, iv, 7, " ••• quia et sentire et meminissi animae est," 
(Keeler, 19), and ibid., v, 9, "•• .videtur mihi anima, cum sentit 
in oorpore, non ab ill,o aliquid pati, sed in ejusp.ssionibus at-
tentius agere." (Keeler, 20) 
34 ~ Trinitate, XI, 2, "Ideoque non possumus quidem dicere quod sen-
sum gignat res visibilis; gignit tamen formam velut similitudinem 
suam, quae fit in sensu, cum aliquid videndo sentimus." ~ uoted 
in Knapke, The Scholastic Theory £! !h!_Species Sensibilia, Oath. 
Univ. Press, Washington, 1915, 20) 
35 DeGen. ad Lit., XII, xvi, 33, "Nee sane putandum est facere aliquid 
corp;. in spiritu, tanquam spiritus corpori facienti materiae vice 
subdatur." (Keeler, 19) 
12 
less satisfying since it contains a number of Aristotelian ideas that 
fit but poorly into the Platonic structure of the explanation. He tried 
to follow Aristotle on some points, but once he denied that the object 
had actual efficient action in the production of sense knowledge, he 
cut himself off from the fpllowers of Aristotle. Without that basic 
tenet no explanation of sense cognition can be truly Aristotelian. 
'fhe Greek theory of sensation was transmitted to the medieval 
scholastics by Arabian philosophers as well as by St. Augustine. These 
eastern thinkers bad contact with Aristotle through Syriac and Arabian 
translations and with Plato through Plotinus and his oriental satellites. 
Their psychology was further influenced by the physiological findings 
of the Arabian physicians. 
J.vicenna, subject to all three of the6e influences, expounded 
a philosophy of sensation that was an unusual mixture of Plato, Aristotle 
and Arabian physiology. He holds, for instance, the extreme dualism of 
body and soul common to Platonists,36 and at the same time defends such 
typically Aristotelian notions as that matter is the principle of in-
dividuation and that all knowledge of external reality must come through 
the senses. 37 
Although Avicenna admits that all knowledge depends on sense 
knowledge, his neo•platonic leanings force him to refuse true efficient 
16 T.J.DeBoer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, trans. by E. Jones, 
Luzac and Co;;-London, 1'§!3, 139 --
37 J • Ledvina, A Philosophy !:!'!!! Psychology ~ Sensation, Cath. Univ. 
Press, wa~ngton, 1941, 18•19 
13 
causality to the objects of sense in actual sensation.38 The forces of 
nature~ it is true, can cause qualitative change in the organs of sense.39 
This physical change Avicenna explains after the manner of Aristotelian 
reception of fo~, but with this important differencea the form is re-
ceived in concreto, with its matter and not, according to the true in-
terpretation of Aristotle's teaching, without the matter but under the 
conditions of matter.40 
Avicenna speaks of sensible forms, the TJTTOf of .Aristotle but 
explains them as physical accidents of the organ of sense. Thus in 
sight, for example, the eye takes on accidents of color, size and ap-
pearance of the objects seen.4l These for.ms are diminutives of the 
object, that is they have the same figure and quality as the object 
but are reduced to fit into the optic nerve (in sigbt) or the other 
nerves of the various sense organs. Since the mutation caused by the 
reception of these forms is on the purely physical plane it cannot, ac-
cording to Avicenna, be the cause of a psychic state. For that an im-
material agent is needed; Avicenna delegates this power to the soul 
which is, then, the true efficient cause of the actual sensation.42 
To show the influence of the Arabians on scholastic philosophers 
38 Knapke, .21?.• cit., 42 
39 DeBoer, m• 9:1., 140 
40 Knapke, 21!• ill•, 39 
41 ibid• 
42 ibid., 42 
14 
it will be worth while to insert here a sketch of the explanation of 
sensation given by John de la Rochelle. Rochelle was one of the many 
scholastics who attached considerable importance to the physiology of 
sensation. In his !!!!!!!!!! ~~he explains the need for media and 
tells us exactly how thesenses operate.43 In his discussion of the 
medium he makes it clear that the object really acts on the medium and 
the medium causes a change in ihe sense.44 
It is obvious from this that Rochelle was acquainted with Aristotle's 
position. Besides this he shows his knowledge of Aristotle's psychology 
on many points. He gives,for example, an accurate account of the unity 
of body and soul as matter aDd form of the same substance, man, 45 and 
declares that the soul bas power to receive "species spirituales in-
telligibiliter" and "similitudines corporales sensibiliter".46 Again 
of the powers of sensation he says, "!!£!!tam animae guam_ corporis 
~ possunt, quia y ~ in corpore fiunt !!!!. ~ utroque . fieri 
pGesut. 47 All this is clearly peripatetic doctrine. But with this 
43 Summa de Apima, (ed.Domenichelli), Prato, 1882, 2571, "Necessarium 
ergo fuit m~um in quolibet sensu." He explains vision,(ibid, 
293), "Sensus enim visus recipit per actionem lucis speciem color-
is ••• Sensus enim fit per receptionem specie1 similitudinis objecti 
non per receptionem ipsius secundum essentiam." 
44 !ill•, 255, "Sonus ••• immutat aerem medium imprimendo ei suam 
speciem," and (ill!•, 257), "lledium immutatum immutat auditum." 
45 ibid., 170, "Ex ani:aJa et corpore fit unum secundum substantiam, 
quod est homo." 
46 !ill·' 132 
47 ~., 224 
15 
he also presents St. Augustine's theory of vision with no sign of die-
48 
approTal. 
All in all John de la Rochelle gives us an unusual conglomeration 
of Aristotelianiam and Augustinianism. Just why he included such con-
tradictory explanations in the same work is not clear. Knapke thinks 
that he had too great a respect for authority and was unable to bring 
himself to make a choice between the traditional Augustinian doctrine 
and the tempting •xplanations of Aristotle newly received from the 
Arabians. 49 Whatever the reason, his compromise is quite untenable§ 
he is left with both horns of the dilemma. Sensation is passive and 
active. It is merely the reception of forms from outside and it is 
the going forth and abstracting of these forms from the object of sense. 
Surely here the last error is worst than the first, for in the final 
analysis John de la Rochelle has no theory of sensation. 
With this we complete our sketch of the history of causality in 
sensation. We have seen the two classic doctrines of the Greeks, those 
of Plato and Aristotle, and we have seen the predominance of the former 
in Plotinus and Augustine. In Avicenna. we saw the resurgence of Aris-
totle's theory, but even here the influence of Plato was too strong to 
be overcome. The result was that Avicenna held the basic Platonic 
stand on causality in sensation although he used Aristotle's explana-
tion of the workings of sensation. In John de la Rochelle we saw the 
48 ill!•, 224; cf. Knapke, 76 and Jl. DeWulf, History of Medieval Philoso-
~' trans. by E. Messenger, Longmans, London, 1926, ~' 350 
49 £2• ~- 79 
~ 
----------------------------------------------------------------------~ 16 
same conflict with John taking no conclusive stand. 
We have come to the point in the history of the scholastig 
~heory of sensation when the stage was perfectly set for the complete 
reinstatement of Aristotle's explanation of causality in sensation. 
Up till this time scholastic philosophers had been trying to unite the 
doctrines of Plato aDd Aristotle into one theory. Now, however, they 
-'re taling more and more of Aristotle and less of Plato. Still they 
were afraid to take over Aristotle's theory bodily.- They felt with 
Plato that no mere sensible object with its form immersed in matter 
could eause the psychic state that is senaaton. Such a state is 
part of the activity of immaterial being and the gap between matter 
and spirit is too wide to be bridged by the activity of any material 
form. As time went on they had allowed greater activity to the object, 
it is true, yet none could allow the object sufficient power to bridge 
the gap between body and soul. It was lett to Albert to re-establish 
a psychology that could bridge the chasm. The explanation of how he 
did it will be the burden of the rest of this paper. 
CHAPTER II 
SOJdE BASIC NOTIONS AND IMPORTANT TEIU4INOLOGY 
Before we enter into a discussion of St. Albert's theory of 
causality in sense cognition, it will be profitable to study several 
ideas basic to his solution. It will be useful, too, to preface our 
discussion of st. Albert's explanation with a clarification of the 
terminology he uses when treating problems of sensation. Such a study 
will be doubly useful. First it will focus our attention on St. 
Albert's contribution to the scientifically exact vocabulary of the 
scpolastic explanation of sensation. And secondly it will allow us 
to give a complete description of St. Albert's theory in the next 
chapter without con&'tant backtracking to explain his terminology. 
perhaps the most conspicuous advance in scholastic language due 
to st. Albert •s his clarification of the meaning of the words 
matter and li!:!!' and potency and !.21• Albert •• one of the first 
scholastics to realize the true Aristotelian meaning of matter and 
form when applied to body and soul. He was the first scholastic to 
solve the problem posed by the peculiar nature of the human soul 
which can live apart from the body after death. '!'he Arabian Aristo-
telians and probably Aristotle hims,lf could not see how the soul as 
form ot the body could continue in existence after its separation from 
the body. Earlier scholastics knowing from faith that the soul did live 
1'1 
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after the death of the body could not see how it could be immersed in 
matter as the form of the body. Albert soh·ed the problem by attribut-
ing a kind of double nature to the soul. It is the motor of the body, 
and so it can exist apart from the body. It is also the form of the 
body and so gives life to the body.l He then explained how this can bea 
The soul is not the motor corporis as a pilot is the navigator of a ship, 
but it is a mover that is a perfection of the thing moved in the very 
nature of that which is moved, 2 because body and soul are not two separate, 
complete entites, as pilot and ship. Rather body and soul together form 
a single hypodyis. 3 The soul can be called a substance only because 
it is the substantial f~rm of the body.4 
Once he accepted this correlation of matter and form for body and 
soul, Albert could and did reject the "rider on the horse" theory spon-
1 s. de Creaturis II, t.l, q.4, a.2, ed. by A. Borgnet, Vives, Paris, 
1898, XXXV, 39, • ••• anima est actus primus ••• qui dat esse et speciem 
et rationem ei cujus est actus." Also, Summa Theologica II, t.12, 
q. 69, m.2, a.2 ad 2 & 3 (Vives XXXIII, 16), "Ad aliud dicendum 
quod animam considerando secundum se, consentiemus Platonia con-
siderando autem eam secundum formam animationis quam dat corpori, 
consentiemus Aristotelir ••• anima quae est t~tum actus corporis, 
sicut vegetabilis iD p1antis, et sensibilia in brutis ••• non separ-
antur a corpore." 
2 s. Th. II, t. 13, q.77, m.l ad 5 (vives XXXIII, 70-71), " ••• dicen• 
dum quod ex motore et mobi1i ubi motor non est perfectio mobilis 
secundum esse naturae, sed ut nauta et navis se habent, et motor 
coeli se habet, numquam fit unuma ex motore autem et mobili ubi mo~or 
perfectie: est mobilis secundum esse naturale, semper fit unum consti-
tutum ex utroque." 
3 ibid., ad 4 (Vives XXXIII, 70), " ••• dicendum quod nee anima nee cor-
pus-eat hypostasis perfeeta, sed homo constitutus ex anima et corpore." 
4 s. Th. II, t.l2, q.69, m.l (Vives XXXIII, 8-9), "Anima enim substan-
tiaest quia est substantialia forma animati." 
sored by Platonists and Augustinians. No longer was he faced with a 
gap between body and soul that had to be bridged by some flimsy, 
spirit-like matter. Hatter and spirit are parts of the same substan-
tial unit. There is no need for a medium between them. Part can 
affect part simp~y because both are parts and not separate substances 
on different rungs of the ladder of being. 
Albert further extended this fuller notion of matter and form to 
the sense faculties and the sense organs. The sense organ, according 
to our Dominican master, is the sense organ precisely because it is 
informed by the faculty. 5 Faculty and organ are, then, one unit. 
Therefore they act as a unit with the result that any affection of 
the organ ~ organ causes a change in the faculty. 6 The practical 
l.9 
conclusion st. Albert drew from this was that now the sense faculties 
could have communication with their objects.7 The object can stimulate 
the sense organ since both are extended and material. But since the 
5 s. de ~· II, q.2, a.l ad 6 (Vives XXXV, 13), " ••• dieendum quod 
in corpore organico nulla forma specifica est anta:~_aaimizD:It.._.Cuc;~enim 
non est caro, nisi per hoc quod est medium in sensu tactus. Simili-
ter nervus non est nervus, nisi per hoc quod est organum animae in-
fluentis per ipsum corpori sensum et motum ••• et sic de al1is membris 
similibus et dissimilibus." 
6 ~Sensu !1 Sensato, t.l, c.5 (Vives IX, 10), "(Aristotelis dicit) 
visibile secundum esse spirituals et intentionale prius effici in 
aere, post in oculo, et moveri speciem rei visae ad interius oculi, 
ubi in humido crystalline est vis visiva ... " Also, ~ de Appre-
hensions I, 5 (Vives V, 557), "Non credas sensibilia in animam agere, 
sed in organa corporwu quae quidem organa, quia animate. aunt, mot us 
sensibilium usque ad animam provenit." 
7 s. de Creat. II, q.34, a.3 ad 5 (Vives XXXV, 303), " ••• sensus est 
susceptivum sensibilium specierum, hoc ipsum quod dico sensibilium 
supponit objectum sensus secundum.actum, et hoc de ratione sui ponit 
praesentiam materiae." 
stimulus affects the sense organ gua. sense organ it also affects the 
sense faculty, by reason of the unity of matter and form. With this 
explanation st. Albert cut the Gordian knot th&t his predecessors h&d. 
tried. vainly to loose. They had labored at the futile task of trying 
to discover a medium between body and soul, between the sense organ 
and its faculty; he came along and showed that such a medium was not 
necessary. 
St. Albert likewise put stronger emphasis on the .Aristotelian 
doctrine of act and. potency than had previous scholastic philosophers. 
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This notion, too, he applied to sense cognition. According to the die-
trine of the Stagirite revived by St. Albert, the sense is a passive 
potency, but .one that has an operation once it is reduced to act.8 
This reduction to actuality from potentiality is effected by sensible 
objects mediately through the sense organ and the exterior and interior 
mediums of ether, air, water and flesh.9 This process is not the usual 
physical change from black to white or hot to cold as many of the earlier 
philosophers, especially the .Arabians, thougb.t.lO Rather it is a change 
8 ibid., q.34, a.l (Vives XXXV, 295-296), " ••• sensus est potentia passiva 
••• sed sensus completus per actum speciei sensitivae judicat et agit." 
9 ibid., ad 3 (Vives XXXV, 296) ttSed faciens sensibilia in aotu colore& 
sensibiles, et motus fractivus aeris facit actu sonos et vaporativum 
in mia.to odorifero facit actu od.o:res, h1.1Idi.dum autem 'tcundum actum 
penetrativum est ad nervum gustat1vum, eT lingua fac1 actu saporesa 
qualitates autem tactus per seipsas agunt in tactum. Et propter hoc 
activum sensuum non potest esse in potentiis animae." . 
10 ibid., corp. (Vives XXXV, 295), "Sensus dicit~ potent~ pass1va non 
quod recipiat formam quae transmutat substant1~ suam ~n substanti~ 
secundum esse, sed potius transmutatur in spec1em sens1bilem secun 
dum intentionea." 
from privation to habit.11 By this he means that the sense receives a 
form not in place of a previous form as when a colored object receives 
a new color, but acquires a form where before it had no for.m. With 
this new form it is then reduced from a state of potency to one of 
actuality, from potential sensation to actual sensation. In this new 
condition it has its proper operation---here the judicium sensus, the 
consciousness of the object.12 Since the sense receives this form by 
being acted upon by the object of sense, Albert says that sensation is 
primarily a passio, and that the faculty is primarily passive. Here 
again, however, we must distinguish between a proper passion, as the 
change from white to black and the passion in sensation which is, as 
we said above, a change from privation to habit.l3 
Another point on which St. Albert adds much to the explanations 
of earlier scholastics is his distinction of the form in sensation 
according to its threefold existence, in the object, in the medium, 
and in the sense. A confusion of thase three stages had made it al-
most impossible for scholastic philosophers before Albert to solve the 
problems of sensation. These earlier thinkers seemed to believe that 
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the form of the object existed physically in the medium and in the sense 
as well as in the object. Obviously this created difficulties. The 
prime objection to such an explanation was that it madi the sense organ 
the object of sense since, according to this, the form of color in sight 
ll ibid., q.2l, a.5 ad 105 (Vives XXXV, 210), " ••• alteratio vero sen-
~ est de privatione in habitum." 
12 cf. supra p.20 n.a 
13 cf. supra P• 20 n.ll 
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would be in the eye as an accident of the eye. If this caused sensa-
tion, it •hould be the object of sensation, for it is the first formal, 
physically existing color with which sight comes in contact. It is 
not at all clear how it could be otherwise. A colored thing, here tl:a 
eye, could hardly be the medium to another colored thing, the external 
object. If anything, it should obstruct the vision of other colored 
thi.ngs.l4 
Albert avoided this difficulty by following Aristotle in giving 
the form a triple existence---in the object, in the medium and in the 
sense. It is in the object materialiter, that is, as physically in-
forming the matter of the object.l5 Thus, for instance, the color of 
a wall is in the wall materialiter---the wall is formally colored; it 
has all the concomitant effects of coloredness, i.e. it ean be seen, 
it can reflect light, and so forth. The sensible form is in the medium 
according to a second mode of existence, which st. Albert calls ~­
biliter.16 In his use of this term our author wishes to point out 
that the form is passing from the object to the sense; there to cause 
14 §._Ih. II, t.ll, q.51, m.l (Vives XXXII, 537), "it ex hoc procedit 
Avicenna, quod si lux est corpus, vel defluxus corporisa aut illud 
corpus est luminosum, aut pervium ••• Si aut em sunt luminosa corpora 
illaa tunc quanto magis densantur, tanto magis impediunt visUm ••• eo 
quod tegunt omnia quae sunt post ipsa." Of. A. Schneider, Die f!l-
chologie Alberts des Grossen, in Beitrage die Geschicte ~ Philoso-
:Ehie, Munster, 1903, 101 
15 s. de Creat. II, q.34, a.2 ad quaest. (Vives XXXV, 300), • ••• di-
;endum quid in veritate in tribus sensibus qui sunt per medium ex-
trinsecum sensibile aliud habet esse in objecto, et in medio, et 
in sensu.' In objecto enim habet ess! materialea. ~ se~su autem 
habet esse spiritual& tantuma in med1o vero sens1b11e. 
16 ibid. 
-
cognition, and does not make the medium colored. If it did, it would 
block vision rather than help it, as we noted earlier. The form is, 
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then, transmitted along the medium without becoming a physical accident 
of the medium.17 The sensible form has its third mode of being in the 
sense proper. There, according to Albert, it exists spiritualiter or 
intentionaliter, by which he means that the sense has in itself a rep-
resentation or.species of the objeet.lB Thus in sight the eye is not 
physically colored but is assimilated to the object through a represen-
t t . 19 Th' t t' •t lf . ll d th . ib'l' 20 a 1on. 1s represen a 1on 1 se 1s ca e e spec1es sens 1 1s. 
Albert also notes this distinction of materialiter, sensibiliter, 
and spiritualiter to show he realized the triple stage of the form in 
sensation, but he himself seldom bothers to be exact in his own use of 
17 ~., " ••• aer habens colorem ut medium non agit actione materiae 
secundum colorema quia nihil colorat." Also §.• de Creat. II, q.2l, 
a.S (Vives XXXV, 209), "Dico aptitudinem recipiendi (formas) ut 
deferens recipit et non ut recipit tenens. Et hoc est quod volunt 
quidam dicere, quod visibilia sunt in medio ut in potentia motus 
et non ut in termino et actu." 
18 §.• ~ Creat. II, q.45, a.2 (Vives XXXV, 414), "Sensus in actu est 
species sensibiliuma et haec taman species nihil est de esse material! 
et naturali rei sensibilis, sed est similitudo illius generata ab 
illa, et per similitudinem quam habet cum re sensata ducit in illam." 
Also, II~ An., t.4, c.l (Vives v, 293), " ••• sensus accipit uniuscu-
jusque sensibilis speciem ••• non in quantum unaquaeque sensibilium 
est unumquodque sensibilium secundum esse materiale sed in quantum 
unumquodque illorum est in esse intentionali et secundum rationem." 
Cf. ~ p.22, n.l5 
19 s. de Creat. II, q.2l, a.s (Vives XXXV, 210), " ••• oculus habet speciem 
visibilem ut habitum vel dispositionem, quae est principium cognos-
cendi rem vi sam." 
20 ct. supra note 18 
the latter two. Frequently be uses spiritualiter and sensibiliter in-
terchangeably. 21 In the same way he notes that the form is really and 
t~uly only in the object; in the medium and in the sense there is only 
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a species or similitudo, yet these three, too, he uses indiscriminately. 
This finishes our chapter on the more important advances in idea 
and terminology made by st. Albert. With clear notions of these terms 
and concepts we can now proceed to Albert's explanation of causality in 
sensation and attempt to determine what contribution he gave to the 
scholastic theory on this point. 
21 cf. Schneider, 90; also II De An., t.3, c.6 (Vives V, 242), "Et non 
unius rationis est esse quod habent in ipso medio, quia spiritualius 
esse est coloris in medio ~uam sonia et iterum spiritualius esse 
est soni in medio quam odoris." 
CHIPTER THREE 
CAUSALITY IN EXTERNAL SENSATION 
ACCORDING TO .ALBERT 
In the previous chapter we have noted that st. Albert advanced 
the scholastic theory of sensation with certain clarifications of 
thought and expression. We showed there that he re-established the 
Aristotelian concepts of act and potency, matter and form, and the 
passive nature of sensation. It would be a mistake, however, to 
think that St. Albert was completely free from the influence of st. 
Augustine and the Platonist scholastics who followed him. In Albert's 
writings there are many vestiges of Augustine's thought •. These are, 
as a matter of fact, so numerous that many present-day writers, follow-
ing Schneider, have declared that Albert merely juxtaposed the doc-
trines ot' Aristotle, Augustine and the earlier scholastics without 
making any attempt to weld them into a unified whole. Schneider in 
the first modern study of Albert's psychology states that it was a mere 
hodge-podge of Augustine, the Fathers, Plat~ and Aristotle.l This 
theory has been sponsored by such men as DeWulf2 and Brett3, more, it 
would seem, on Schneider's word than on any independent investigation 
l Schneider, 4-5 
2 DeWu~f, I, 397, 401 
3 G. Brett• ~ History of Psychology, Allen & Unwin, London, 1921, II, 
108 
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of their ow.n. More recently, however, two Dominicans, Wilms4 in Ger-
many, and Reilly5 at the Catholic University of America, have made 
new investigations and have decided that Schneider greatly exaggerated 
the heterogeneous composition of Albert's philosophy. These authors 
have pointed out that in some instances Schneider failed to distinguish 
Albert's explanations of the theories of other philosophers from his 
criticism of them. Albert's procedure, they tell us, varies with the 
type of work that engaged his attention. Unlike St. Thomas, Albert 
merely paraphrased the doctrines of the authors on whose works he 
commented. In all his remarks in these works he takes the viewpoint 
of the authors in question.6 In his commentary on the Politics of 
Aristotle he states explicitly that his only purpose in writing such 
commentaries is to outline the theories of these earlier philosophers 
without committing himself to a defense of their positions. He states 
this quite vigorously7a 
Non ego dixi aliquid in isto libro, nisi ex-
ponendo quae dicta sunt, et rationes et causae 
adhibendo. Sicut enim in omnibus libris phy-
sicis, numquam de meo dixi aliquid, sed opiniones. 
Peripateticorum quanto fidelius potui, exposui. 
Et hoc dico propter quosdam inertes, qui so-
latius suae in .. rtiae quaerentes, nihil quaerunt 
in scriptis nisi quod reprehendant; et cum tales 
sunt torpentes in inertia, ne soli torpentes 
videantur, quaerunt ponere maculam in electis. 
Tales Socratem occiderunt. Platonem de Athenis 
4 R. Wilms, Albert the Great, trans. by A. English, Burns Oates and 
Washbourne, London, 1933, 82 
5 G. Reilly, !h!, Psychology of St. Albert i!'!! Great, Oath. Univ. Press, 
Washington, 1934, 54 
6 ibid., 55 
7 Jn VIII Politica, note ad fin. (Vives VIII, 803-804) 
in Academiam f'ugaverunt, in Aristotelem 
machinantes etiam eum exira compulerunt ••• 
In some commentaries, however, as in his Delntellectu.!! Intelli-
gibili, St. Albert included doctrines or Plato which he thou~ did not 
contradict Aristotle's opinions.8 Sometimes these doctrines are not 
as consonant with peripatetic philosophy as Albert seemed to believe 
and so we have a juxtaposition of' explanations mutually exclusive.9 
Wilms seeks to lessen the blame f'or this by emphasizing Albert's de-
sire to get the whole truth and his consequent reluctance to reject 
anything which might in some way complement the Aristotelian explana-
t . 10 10De 
As a result Albert's works do include strong traces of' Platonic 
and Augustinian influence. The authority of' the bishop of' Hippo and 
Plato forced Albert to weigh their opinions carefully. In doing this 
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he aeeepted some and "interpreted" others in such a way as to bring 
them into agreement with those of Aristotle.11 At other times instead 
of r•conciling the two he merely juxtaposed conflicting explanations.12 
8 Deintellectu!! Intelligibili, c.l {Vives IX, 478), ttQuaecumque vero 
hie inquirenda esse videntur quantum per demonstrationem et rationem 
investigare poterimus, tractabimus sequentes principis nostri vestigia 
••• Interdum etiam Platonis recordabimur in his in quibus Perpateti-
corum sententiis in nullo contradicit." This work was written by 
Albert to f'ill a supposed gap in the works of Aristotle. As such 
it is a commentary on a work that was never written. Albert took 
the doctrines in it f'rom Aristotle's other works. 
9 Reilly, 55 
10 Wilms, 82 
11 ~., 70 
12 Reilly, 55 
,... 
Since it is not within the scope of this paper to give a complete 
study of st. Albert's philosophy, we need not concern ourselves with 
the success or failure of Albert's general synthesis of philosophy. 
Still we must note two points and decide whether Albert followed Aris-
totle or Augustine and Plato in his explanation of them, for they are 
key doctrines in the explanation of causality in sensation. 
We showed in the last chapter that .Albert held the Aristotelian 
theory of matter and form as applied to soul and body. Aristotle, 
however, was not clear on personal immortality, and many thinkers 
could not see how in his system the form of the body could .exist apl:il't 
from the body. Similarly they failed to see how a purely spiritual 
process such as intellection could be performed by a soul that was 
the form of a material body. And the soul must be the form of the 
body for the followers of Aristotle. The objectors proclaimed that a 
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form thus "immersed in matter" could have no purely spiritual activity 
and so could have no reason for being immortal. To meet this dilemma. 
Albert said that the soul was more than just the form of the body; it 
was, as Plato said, the ~ corporis,. and as such had a certain reality 
in itself •13 Perhaps this was not the clearest way to explain the 
peculiar nature of the human soul, but the idea Albert wanted to convey 
with this expression was certainly a legitimate extension of the Aris-
totelian position. Albert retained the basic notion that the soul was 
13 s. Th. II, q.69, m.2, a.2 sol. (Vives XXXIII, 16), " ••• ita ~ima du-
plicem debet habere definitioneml unum quod operatur vit~e 1n corBore 
et in or~s ejus ••• alia definitio est quae aatur de ~ secun.um 
se ••• maxime secundum quam partem opera vitae operatur 1n seipsa; 
cf. Wilms, 70 
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the £o~ o£ the body while adding the equally essential idea that the 
soul does not exhaust its complete reality in this information. 
This is o£ some importance to us because the soul must be the 
form o£ the body i£ we are to have the interaction o£ the two necessary 
1or the Aristotelian explanation o£ sensation. I£ Albert had taken 
over the complete Platonic notion o£ soul he would have had to £ace 
the same problem that puzzled his predecessorsa the problem o£ the 
causality o£ matter on~irit. This would have been a difficulty £or 
him, because then he would have had the same gap between body and soul 
that is postulated by every Platonic explanation. Following Aristotle, 
St. Albert could use the substantial union o£ body and soul as matter 
and form to close the chasm that others had to bridge. 
A aecond instance o£ St. Albert's use o£ Augustinia.u language 
that we JDUet consider is that o£ his adoption o£ a "medium" between 
body and 8oul. At first sight this would seem to show that Albert 
did £eel that there was a gap between body and soul that he had to 
bridge in some way. Closer inspection, however, shows us that Albert's 
"medium" between the two is in some instances a quality o£ the nerve 
fibers and in others something roughly corresponding to the hormones 
o£ the endocrine glands o£ modern biology. The truth o£ this interpre-
tation is manifest £rom the numerous places Where St. Albert says that 
this "medium" is a spiritus, and that the spiritus is something very 
14 2• de ~· II, ~.78, (Vives XXXV, 637) 
15 ~· Theol. II, q.7, m.2 (Vives XXXIII, 73) 
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definitely corporeal. In his own wordul4 "Generals. medium ill spiritus 
qui secundum medicos est medium inter aerem et ignem ••• " And again in 
15 
sensationa " .. ·~ ~ intelligi !! spiritu gui sit spiritualis 
substantia n anima vel parte eius, ~ !!! spiritu quiHdpfert .forma.s 
sensibles &£ organi! sensuum ad animam, guem probat Avicenna !!!! ~-
pore:;:J. \Vha.t is more, this medium does not exist to unite the soul and 
body, but only to mediate the activity of the. soul throughout the body.l6 
So it would seem that Albert is dealing with the physiology of the body 
and showing how many of its activities are not regulated directly by the 
soul, but rather through the activity of nerve& and hormones, as we would 
say today. This is confirmed by the phrase "according to the physician" 
with which Albert explains the nature of the general medium of the soul's 
operations in the body.l7 Really, then, St. Albert has transformed the 
medium as known to Augustine and earlier scholastics and has reduced it 
to a merely physiological factor in the vital operations of the human 
composite. As such it fits in perfectly with the Aristotelian explana-
tion of the body-soul relationship.18 
We have tried to clarify the problem of a medium between body and 
soul, because it reflects on the problem of the union between the two. 
If Albert admitted a medium in the Augustinian sense, he would have 
shown that he did not understand his own doctrine of matter and form, 
and be would once more have been faced with a gap between body and soul---
16 !• ~ Creat. II, q. 78 (Vives XXXV, 637), "anima sine medio est in 
corpore sed non sine medio operatur." 
17 !2![., cf. p.28 note 13 
18 Reilly, 18 
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the recurrent Platonic problem. 
It has been necessary to dwell on these fundamental issues for with 
false explanations of these one could give what would seem to be a com-
pletely Aristotelian explanation of the mechanics of the sensitive pro-
cess and still not admit the basic Aristotelian notion of thecontinuity 
of the causality from object to sense faculty. Whether Albert did 
follow out the Aristotelian explanation we shall see in a moment. We 
have seen already that, if nothing more, he had the necessary foundation 
for the correct answer in the Aristotelian substantial union of body 
and soul as matter and for.m. We insist the more on this because cer-
tain Arabs seemed to have followed Aristotle, yet they could never 
realize the import of the substantial union of body and soul. The re-
sult was ever the same, they al.•ys left a gap to be bridged, and in 
every case they failed to span it. So, instead of postulating inter-
causality of body and soul, they made the bodily changes the occaaon 
of sense cognition, never its cause. 
As a matter of fact, however, Albert did follow Aristotle in his 
whole theory of sensation. Schneider notes that our saint used scien-
tific discoveries of the Arabians, but that he followed Aristotle most 
closely just. on thos points where the Arabians departed from the Stagi-
rite's doctrine.19 A description of st. Albert's theory of sensation 
19 Schneider, 88 
will show the truth of this remark. 
The object of sense according to St. Albert is the sensible thing 
existing outside the sentient subject.20 Thus, the object of sight is 
the colored thing really existing in the external world.21 So, too, 
the other senses have external objectsa sound for hearing, odors for 
smell, savors for taste, and tangible qualities for touch.22 Albert 
had no time for philosophies that spoke of material reality as a world 
of shadows and faint representations of a higher, truer reality.23 
And not only did the objects of sense exist outside the subject of 
sensation, but they were of themselves capable of causing a knowledge 
of themselves in animals and men. 24 They took an active part in sen-
sation, generating species in the sen~e, and so causing percep~n. 
25 They are not in any way acted upon by the sense. 
20 ! de An., t.2, c.8 {Vives v, 164), "Sensus qui est motus sensi-
bilium specierum est pertingens ab exterioribus usque ad anh~~am." 
Also~· de Creat. II, q.34, a.l ad 3 {Vives XXXV, 296), " ••• actus 
sensuum non poteet esse in potentia animae." 
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21 II~ An., t.3, c.'T (Vives v, 245), " ••• objectum cujus dicitur esse 
visus ut propria causa inferens sibi passionem, ••• dicitur visibile; 
naibile, aute:m. ••t color." 
22 For hearing, ~· de Creat. II, q.24, a.l (Vives XXXV, 233), "sonus ••• 
dicitur qualitas sensibilis sensus auditus." For smell, ~., q. 
31 (Vives XXIV, 271), "Cum objectum (olfactus) sit unum, scilicet 
odor, unius rationis erit olfactus." For taste a ibid. II, q.32, 
a. 2 {Vives XXXV 274), " ••• gustus ••• est judicium saporum.'' J'Dr 
toucha ~· II, q.33, a.l {Vives XXXV, 282), " ••• tactus est ••• 
tangibilium judicium." 
23 cf. Wilms, 72 
24 2• de Creat. II, q.22 ad 8 (Vives XXXV, 225), " ••• motus immutationis 
est motus eorum (colorum) quo generant se primo in medio et postea 
in oculo." 
25 ibid. II, q.45, a.4 {Vives :XXXV, 417), " ••• organa sensuum tantum pati 
in sentiendo et nihil agere nisi per accidens." Cf. supra p.20 
n.9 
Sensible objects, however, except those of touch, act in conjunc-
tion with certain dispositions of their media in this process of caus-
ing sensation. 26 Thus color and light unite to cause vision in the 
eye, sound and a certain motion of the air, to cause hearing, and so 
33 
forth. Albert calls this union of light and color a union "as of matter 
and form." 27 For, he tells us, color exists materially in the object 
until acted upon by light; then it has formal existence as color. 28 
In this he claims to follow Aristotle who makes "Color secundum actum 
·lucidi"29 the object of sight. Albert concludes from this that light 
makes color visible because "actus lucidi ~ est, et hanc neguaguam 
diceret .!!!! coloris naturam, ~ aiiguo ~ daret. ei .!!!.!!. et speciem"~30 
The object, onct ~ated by this necessary disposition of the medium 
generates a representation of itself in the medium and the sense. 31 
As we noted above, St. Albert includes all the senses except touch in 
this explanation. Tangible qualities, the object of touch, act of 
26 ibid. II, q.34, a.l ad 3 (Vives XXXV, 296), "Sed faciens sensibilia 
in actu in rebus est, sicut lux facit actu colores sensibiles, et 
motus fractivus aeris facit actu sonos, et calidum vaporativum in 
mixto odorifero facit actu odores, humidum autem secundum actum 
penet~ativum est ad nervum gustativum, et lingua facit actu saporesa 
qualitates autem tact us per seipsas a.gunt in tactum." 
27 ibid. II, q. 21, a.3 (Vives XXXV, 200), " ••• color enim secundum 
actum cum lumine quo agit unum visibile esta sicut materia et forma 
non faciunt duo, sed unuma et ideo cum lumen illud sit ut forma, 
color autem ut materia, erit ex illis duobus unum visibile secun-
dum actum." 
28 ibid. II, q.21, a.l (Vives XXXV, 188), "Color habet duplex esse, 
scilicet materiale •• et esse formals secundum quod ipse movet sen-
sum •••• Color est visibilis non omni modo, sed in ratione formali, 
hoc est per actum luminis, qui dat ei actum et speciem secundum 
quod poteet agere in visum." 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid., (Vives XXXV, 189) 
31 cf. p.23 n.l8 
34 
themselves on their proper sense organ, the flesh. 32 
St. Albert noted the obvious fact that sensibile objects are not 
always in contact with-the sentient subject. The colored object may 
be yards from the eye that sees it; the sound of a bell may be heard 
for miles. Odors, too, may float in from a distance. Noting this, 
Albert, treated the question of media quite thoroughly. First he 
divided them into two classes, exterior and interior. Exterior madia 
are air and water; interior media are flesh and what he called "humidum 
aqueum".33 In sight air and water convey the sensible from the object to 
34 
the eye. They are not, however, media by virtue of their own natures 
but only insofar as they share in the diaphanous quality of light, a 
participation of the famous "fifth essence". 35 Air and water are also 
media for sound. 36 Air, besides being the medium for sound, is also. 
the subject in which it exists. 37 Sound, according to Albert, is "a 
sensible quality arising from the breaking movement of air, t..nd existing 
32 2• ~ Oreat. II, q.33 a.3 (Vives XXXV, 290), " ••• tactus pertingit 
ad partes carnis et cutis." 
ibid. II, q.21, a.S (Vives XXXV, 204), "(in visu) aer et aqua sunt 
medium;" ill!!• q.25 (Vives XXXV, 253), "Sonus duplex habet medium 
33 
scilicet aerem et aquam;" ibid., q.30 (Vives XXXV, 270), "Odor 
est in aqua et in aere ut in medio;" ibid., q.32 a.4 (Vives XXXV, 
280), "lledium in gustu est humidum aqueum;" ~., q.33, a.3 (Vives 
.XXXV, 290), " ••• caro quamdam rationem habet medii." 
34 Cf. note 33 
35 s. de Creat. II, q.21, a.5 (Vives XXV, 204-205), "Aer et ~qua sunt 
36 
3'1 
;ed~~n secundum quod aer et aqua ••• (~ed ex) nat~a 1n qua 
communicant aer et aqua cum perpetuo super1us corpore. 
c!. note 33 
s. de Creat. II, q.36 (Vives XXXV, 
iateri;-rn-quo generatur sonus, et 
Aqua vero est medium tantum." 
252) "Aer enim est medium et 
• • sine quo non est 8JUS esse. 
with that movement.•38 Once the movement atope, sound stops. 39 
Odors, like color, are qualities of external bodies.4° They too 
have air and water for media in which like color they do not exist 
41 formally. Taste and touch are sensed through internal media, in 
taste the humidum agueum, and in touch the flesh.42 The sensibles of 
taste and touch are in the media in the double sense in Which sound is 
in air, that is as in their natural subjects and as in the medium~ 
medium.43 
Thus, for all the senses there are media and for all the senses 
there are the species existing in the media. 44 This is what .llbert 
means when he says that the sensibles are in the medium qua medium. 
Strictly speaking, this would not be necessary, since there is no 
reason why the quality physically existing in the medium could not 
cause its representation directly in the organ. Nonetheless Albert 
folloWE Aristotle and the physiologists in positing the existence of 
the species in the medium. 45 
38 ibid. II, q.24, a.l (Vives XXXV, 233), "Dicimus ergo, quod sonus 
est qualitas sensibilia, proveniens ex fractions aeris, et ens 
cum illo." 
39 ibid., " ••• sonus non habet esse nisi qua.mdiu durat motus ille." 
40 ibid. II, q.26, a.s (Vives XXXV, 265), "Dicimus ••• quod sapor et 
odor sunt sequelae complexionum corporum odorantium." 
41 ibid. II, q.30 (Vives XXXV, 270), "Od()r est in aere et aqua ut in 
medio 
42 cf. supra P• 34 n. 33 
43 s. de Creat. II, q.32, a.4 (Vives XXXV, 280), "•• .(humidum aqueum) 
;st '"iedium et materiae et non medium tantum;" ibid. II, q.34, a.2 
(Vives XXXV, 301), "Duo autem sensus qui sunt per medium intra, 
habent sensibilia quae actu sunt ••• in medio." 
44 II~ An., t.4, c.4 (Vives v, 297), " ••• sed tamen medium non agit 
in organum nisi esse intentionale." 
45 ~· 
35 
; 
36 
St. Albert makes clear that the sense receives the sensible species 
without the matter of the sensible object or the matter of the medium. 
With his explanation of the special type of existence the sensibles have 
in their media, he has already detached the sensible for.m from its mat-
ter. It is no longer a form informing matter---at least it is not a 
form only informing ma.tter.46 It has a "spiritual" existence of some 
47 sort. Since it is already thus detached from matter it is not re-
ceived into the sense organ as whiteness is taken in by a wall. The 
sensible comes in according to the new mode of being, one connected 
especially and specifically with the cognitive function.48 Just how 
we can better explain this I do not know. We know that 1he form is 
still under the conditions of matter so it is singular and not univer• 
sa1.49 We can hardly give a fuller explanation. 
When asked how material bodies had the power to effect this un-
usual change in the medium and the organ, st. Albert brushed the ques-
tion aside as irrelevant, comparing it to o~e•s asking why light shines.50 
46 cf. supra P• 34 n.37 and n.43 on ta.-~r~Ee· 
47 We use spiritual here in the sense that Albert notes it in his Summa 
de Creaturis II, q.21, a.5 (Vives XXXV, 209), " ••• non vocat esse 
spirituale a spiritu qui est anima sed a spiritu qui est corpus." 
48 II de An· t. 4, c.l (Vives, V, 293-294), • ••• sequitur quod primum 
sentiens cum est in actu, est tale quale quidem ipsum sensibile: 
sed alterum est esse ejus hinc et inde secundum quod est in esse 
intentionali actus sensus." 
49 ~., "Primum autem quod communiter convenit omni sensui secundum 
quod est sensus, est quod omnis est in gradu illo apprehensionis 
quod accipit speciem sensibilem sine materia, materia tamen prae-
sente." 
50- ibid., t.3, c.6 (Vives V, 241) 
••• concedendum esse videtur, quod aliquando 
at in quibusdam sensibus qui scilicet sunt 
per medium extrinsecum, sensibile secundum 
aliui esse est in re sensata, et secundum 
aliud esse in medio et organoa sed hoc ease 
in nullis pluribus sensibus est unius ra-
tionis. Et si quaeritur quid conferat ei hoc 
esset videtur mihi stulta quaestio, quia nos 
super-ius ostendimus omnem virtutem activam 
esse per se perfectam ad agendum, sine ali-
quo motivo extrinseco1 et ideo dico quod 
forma sensati per seipsam generat se in 
medio sensus secundum esse sensibile, cuius 
necessaria demonstratio est, quod ab omni-
bus Philosophis et ab ipsa veritate con-
vincitur, per se sensibile esse, .quod in 
secundo modo dicendi per essentiam suam est 
causa sui esse sensibilisa et ideo frustra 
quaeritur quid conferat ei illudt sicut si 
quaeritur quid conferat luci lucere secun-
dum actumt 
Albert makes it clear that the medium and the i'aculty must be so 
constructed that they can receive the forms of sensible objects be-
cause act and potency are correlative. The act can always actuate but 
it can actuate only such things as are made to receive the act. In 
51 Albert's words • 
••• sicut saepe diximus, non quaelibet passiva 
vel passibilia recipiunt actus activorum quorum-
libeta sed actus sensibilium recipiunt quaedam 
passiva secundum quod harmonica sunt sensitiva 
eorum • 
••• notandum ergo ad hoc quod aliquid sit sen-
sibile per se et proprius ••• exiguntur ••• quod 
substantia sensus illius organi aptanata sit 
pati ab illo et non ab alio1 sicut visus 
colorum est, quem non contingit sentire per 
51 ~., t.4, c.2 (Vives v, 294-295) 
52 £• de Creat. II, q.34, a.2 (Vives XXXV, 299) 
37 
38 
se a\ulitu vel olf"aetu vel aliquo sensu ••• 
This correlation of potency and act is the final answer which St. Albert 
gives when asked bar sensation is possible. 
St. Albert does not seem to have thought that sensation took 
place in the end organs of the various senses. Rather he localized 
the faculties in various parts of the brain and, for taste and touch, 
near the heart as well as in the brain. The act of seeing, for example, 
53 is completed, according to Albert, in the front part of the cerebruma 
••• virtue visiva secundum sui perfectionem 
est in anteriori parte cerebri, sed secundum 
progressum ad perfectionem est in nervo op-
tico et spiritu visibili qui discurrit in 
illoa et sic nihil prohibet quiD vis visiva 
diversimode consider~ta diversa habet in-
strumenta, sicut etiam una vis visiva habet 
duos oculos. 
Hearing is situated in "anteriori parte medullae_ cerebr.L,;•54 Smell is 
rooted in the anterior of the cerebrum along with sigbt.55 Taste, as 
we mentioned, has a double seat, "!:!!12. modo quod est judicium saporum 
•• et ~nervus gustativus principiatur ~ cerebro ••• alio ~secundum 
56 guod est sensus alimenti ••• ~ instrumentum circa .2.2!:" ~ Touch 
is similar to taste in thisa 57 
53 ibid., II, 
54 ibid., II, 
55 ibid.' II, 
56 ~, II, 
57 ~., II, 
CUm enim tactus sit sicut forma corporis 
animati ••• percipit quidquid immutat cutem 
••• quoad hoc principalitur tactus est in 
corde ••• Secundum autem quod tactus est 
judicium tangibilium sic principiatur ••• in 
cere bro. 
q.l9, a.l ad 3 (Vives XXXV, 166) 
q.23 (Vives XXXV, 229) 
q.2B, a.l (Vives XXXV, 256) 
q.32, a.3 (Vives XXV, 279 
q.33, a.3 (Vives XXXV, 289-290) 
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In St. Albert's psychology of sensation the psychic element is 
added to sensation when the species reach the seat of sensation. There, 
too, the sense is completely reduced to act and posits its proper opera-
tion, the perception of the sensible object:58 
••• dicimus enim quod nullius sensibilis 
judicium perficitur in organo proprii 
sensus qui recipit illud sensibile, sed 
omnes particulares nervi qui ad organa 
propriorum sensuum diriguntur, ••• 
diriguntur ad anteriorem partem cerebri ••• 
Concerning the nature of the species in sensation insofar as it 
is a representation, st. Albert agreed with Aristotle and held the 
interpretation which st. Thomas was also to take up. The species in 
sensation is a means to the cognition of something else. It is not, 
then, that which is known but that by which something else. is known. 59 
In the language of st. Thomas and later scholastics it is a medium guo 
and not a medium guod. 60 
The reason for this stand is similar to that proposed for the 
nature of light, which we discussed earlier. 61 St. Albert declared 
that light was not a body but a quality that made air and water trans-
parent. It was "pervium" because if it were not it would block vision 
rather than help it, since it would be seen instead of the object. 
So too the species must be a medium quo lest it block cognition by 
becoming the thing which is perceived. st. Albert does not give a 
58 II de An, t 1r, c.ll (Vives V, 310) 
59 ~·~~·II, q.45, a.2 (Vives XXXV, 414); ef. supra p.23 n.l8 
60 cf • s. Thomas, De ~ et Sensato, leet. 4 
61 cf. supra PP• 32-33 
,.. 
thorough treatment of this problem but simply notes that the object 
of vision is the colored thing (and so for the other senses) and t~t 
the species is a representation that leads to the knowledge o£ these 
objects. 
This description o£ St. Albert's theory of external sensation is 
40 
enough for our purpose. From it we can see clearly enough what he con-
sidered to be the cause of cognition in external sensation. We have 
attempted to answer in the above description the question we put at 
the beginning of our discussiona "What causes sense cognition?" 
Obviously, according to St. Albert, the sensible object existing 
objectively in the external world is the efficient cause of the sensi-
ble species, which in turn cause sensation by reducing the faculty 
i'rom potency to act. We have seen that Albert said explicitly thata 
"(visibile) speciem sui generat in medio at ~ organo ••• n62 And again, 
" ... dicendum quod organa sensuum tantum pati et ~ agere nisi per 
accidens ••• n 63 Once more, adding a bit on the. nature of the species a 
"dicendum quod in veritate species sensibiles generantur in organo .!!!'.!-
!!!!•uet haec~ species ~ de !.!!.! materiali ll naturali !:!!, 
~ est similitudo illius generata ab i11a, et per simi1itudinem guam 
habet £S!! r.! duci t in illam. u64 
In this we see that the causality proceeds link by link from the 
object, through the medium, to the sense organ. This much many pre-
62 ~· ~ Creat. II, q.45, a.2 ad 2 (Vives XXXV, 415) 
63 ibid. II, q.45, a.4 (Vives XXXV, 417-418) 
64 ~· II, q.45, a.2 (Vives XXXV, 414) 
vious philosophers had admitted. What they did not admit was that the 
sensible species in the organ could exert any causal influence on the 
faculty. St. Albert came to this juncture and decided to follow Aris-
totle all the way. So, leaving behind the earlier scholastics, he 
admitted causality from the sense organs to the faculties. This is 
the reason why he saida "sensus completus per actum species sensitivae 
,judicat et agit."65 Again he admitted that the sense faculty is pass-
ive when he said explicitly& "se~sus est potentia passiva. •• 66 In 
41 
neither of those places does he limit the causal influence to the body. 
~n both it is simply sensusa it is not corpus or organum. 
J'rom all this we can say with certainty that st. Albert did re-
establish the Aristotelian notion of causality in sensation. For him 
as for the Stagirite, the object is active, the subject passive until 
informed by the sensible species. With Aristotle, St. Albert depends 
on the substantial union of matter and form to close the gap between 
body and soul that had made other philosophers take refuge in occasion-
. 
alistic theories of sensation. Albert has in very truth taken over the 
whole Aristotelian structure. All that remains for us is to compare 
Albert's answer with that of St. Thomas. Such a study will show us how 
much of the complete scholastic theory we owe to St. Albert and how 
much his famous pupil added to his eJp lanation. 
65 ibid. II, q.34, a.l ad 2 (Vives XXXV, 296) 
66 ~· II, q.34, a.l (Vives ~v, 296) 
CHAPTER FOUR 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
In the pr6vious chapters of this paper we have traced the devel-
opment of the scholastic theory of causality in external sensation from 
Plato and Aristotle down to St. Albert the Great. In this outline we 
saw the two tendencies, Platonic and Aristotelian, each struggling to 
supplant the other. The Platonic explanation seemed to be the more 
widely accepted right up to the time of St. Albert the Great. Certain 
details of the peripatetic theory were accepted, but the complete 
adoption came only with st. Albert. 
Now in this last chapter we shall test Albert's solution in the 
light of St. Tho:uas Aquir.a.s' doctrine, and with this we can decide how 
much of the complete scholastic theory Albert had. Our task in this 
is rather simple, for Albs-t' s famous pupil has taken over his master's 
doctrine with hardly a change. As we might expect, Thomas is more in-
terested in the metaphysics of sensation than in the physiology of the 
process, with the result that he treats the strictly philosophical 
problems more explicitly than Albert and spends little time on the 
physiological side of the question.l This, however, is more a differ-
l The only places where St. Thomas gives any extensive treatment of 
sensation are in his commentaries on Aristotle's Q! ~and De 
~ !i Sensato. In his ~ Theologiea he treats sensation in 
two. articles of a single question (I, q.78, a.3 and 4). In the 
De Veritate there are a few passing references to sensation. 
42 
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ence of emphasis than anything else, so it does not deny the correct-
ness of Albert's explanation. 
It is a simple matter to show how closely st. Thomas followed 
Albert since the two agree on all the main issues concerning sensation. 
Eoth have the same Aristotelian foundation. Thomas, like Albert, bases 
his psychology on the classic notions of potency and act and matter and 
form. Thus the soul for the Angelic Doctor is the form of the body, 
yet it is more than a mere corporeal form.2 As such it has two sets 
of capabilities, those it uses with the body and those whose operation 
is independent of the body.3 Of the former the sensitive powers are 
highest and most noble; the latter are the faculties of the intellectual 
part of the soul.4 
Sensation itself is for st. Thomas what it was for Albert, a mode 
of cognition inferior to intellection.s It is an activity of the human 
composite of body and soul.6 Thoms, more than Albert, emphasizes the 
unity of the act of sensation. Albert, more concerned with the physio-
2 §. !• I, q.75, a.l ad 4, "Humana anima non est forma in materia 
corporali immersa, vel ab ea totaliter comprehensa, .propter suam 
perfectionem; et ideo nihil prohibet aliquam ejus virtutem non esse 
corporis actum, quamvis anima secundum suam essentiam sit corporis 
formam." 
3 ibid., corp., "Unde intantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem, 
quod habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo modo com-
municat materia corporalis, et haec virtus dicitur intellect us;" 
~., q.B4, a.6, "Sed (Aristotelis) sensum posuit propriam opera-
tionem non habere sine communicatione corporis, ita quod sentire non 
sit actus animae tantum, sed conjuncti." 
4 ibid., q.77, a.4, "Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem 
(i.e. perfectionis) potentiae sensitivae ••• sunt priores potentiis 
animae nutritivae;" for intellect cf. note 3. 
5 cf. ~·!• I, q.78, a.3 
6 ct. note 3 
r 
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logical problems of sensation, gave long explanations of the bodily 
process, almost taking for granted the role of the faculty in sensation. 
It is certain, however, that he did think of sensation as a unified 
whole, even though he seemed to separate the parts in his discussion.7 
The sense for both is a passive potency Which has actual sensation 
only when it is informed by the activity of the objects of sense.8 
These objects are actually sensible, that is, they are able of the~ 
selves to reduce the sense from potency to act.9 This reduction takes 
place through the reception of the sensible form in a passive way.10 
Still the faculty is not completely passive for Thomas any more than 
it was for his teacher. Both agreed that the sense, once informed, 
posite its proper operation, the judicium sensus.11 
Thomas like Albert held five external sensesa sight, hearing, 
smell, taste, and touch.12 The objects of these senses are physically 
existing bodies possessed of full reality apart from the subject of 
7 this is clear from Albert's description of sense as "potentia passiva 
••• {quae) transmutatur in speciem sensibilem secundum intentionem ••• 
quando vero habet speciem sensibilem, tunc est potentia completa 
per actum." (§. ~ ~· II, q.34, a.l, Vives XXXV, 295-296) 
8 For Albert of. supra P• 20 n. 9; for Thomas c£. s. T. I, q.ss, a.l 
ad 2, " ••• sensus in actu est sensibile in actu, ••• non ita quod ipsa 
vis sensitive. sit ipsa similitude sensibilia quae est in sensu, sed 
quia ex utroque fit unum, sicut ex actu et potentia." 
9 2• l• I, q.79, a.3 ad 1, " ••• sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra 
animam." 
10 Quodlib. Vii, a.3, "Sensus autem exteriores suscipiunt tantum a re-
bus per modum patiendi sine hoc aliquid cooperantur, ad sui forma-
tionem." 
11 ~., " ••• (sensus) iam formati habeant proprium operationem quae 
est judicium de propriis obiectis." 
12 §• I• I, q.78, a.3 
13 
sensation. He, no less than Albert, gave the exterior world full 
objective existence. Thus the object of sight is the visible object 
existing apart from the sense; the subject of hearing is sound, and so 
on for the other senses.l4 
St. Thomas agrees with his teacher that all of these objects of 
sense cannot act directly upon the senses. Some must act through 
special media, while others can directly i:I.H'ect the sense organs.15 
Three senses must act through external media. Of these sight can be 
45 
caused only when color acts through the medium off air or water. These 
are media, however only in so far as they are transparent or "diaphanous". 
Hearing also takes place through an external medium, or rather either of 
two exteriDr media, air or water. Smell is the third sense that operates 
13 ~., I, q.85, a.l, "Quaedam virtua cognoscitiva est actus organi 
corporalis, scilicet sensus; et ideo objectum cujuslibet sensitivae 
po,en~iae est forma, prout in materia corporali existit." 
14 II !! An., lect. 14, " ••• visibi1e est color;" ~., lect. 16, 
" ••• determinat de audibili ••• id est de sono;" ibid., lect. 19, 
• ••• non ita bene determinari potest de odore ••• SICUt de praedictis 
sensibilibus;" ~., lect. 20, " ••• ostendit quod ••• sapor, qui est 
gustabile ••• ;" ibid., • ••• tangibili, quod est objectum tactus ••• " 
15 In one place in his commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle Thomas 
succinctly states his own position concerning media in sensation, 
(II~ .An., lect. 15), "Oatendit quid sit medium in his sensibus; 
et dicit quod illud quod movetur a sono est aer; medium quod move-
tur ab odore, est aliquid commune aeri et aquae, et sicut utrumque 
eorum est medium quod movetur a colore; sed a colore movetur utr~ 
que horum, secundum quod diaphanum." Although Thomas does not men-
tion water as a medium for sound in this lectio, he does so a few 
pages later, (!lli•• lect. 17), " ••• audimus in aere et in aqua." 
through an external medium. It, like sound, takes place with either 
air or water to carry the sensible forms to its organ. Thomas says 
that touch and taste use internal, but no external media.l6 This 
agrees with Albert's opinion as we noted above.l7 
46 
Sense cognition for St. Thomas was a process of assimilation of sub-
ject to object. This is clear from his famous dictuma sensus !!! actu 
est sensibile ~ actu.18 By this, however, he did not mean that the 
sense became physically identical with its object. This assimilation 
i'or Thomas as for Albert took place through a species or image.19 The 
object causes a representation {similitudo) of itself in the sense, 
directly or mediately, and by this causes perception of itself. 20 
St. Thomas also called this an intentional union or one ger modum ~­
tentionis,21 which are simply different expressions to explain the 
peculiar union necessary for cognition. This is exactly the position 
held by St. Albert, and it is expressed in practically the same terms. 22 
16 De Sensu !1 Sensato, lect. 14, " ••• duo {sensus) ••• sentiunt suum 
sensibile conjunctum non per medium extraneum, scilicet tactus 
et gustus." 
17 cf. supra PP• 32-34 
18 2• !• I, q.55, a.l ad 2 
19 Q! ~ et Sensato, lect. 2, "Quid autem sit sensus ••• ostendit ••• 
per hoc scilicet quod animalia recipere possunt species sensi-
bilium." 
20 g ~ An., lect. 13, " ••• substantia uniusquisque sensus et eius 
definitio est in hoc quod est aptum natum pati a tali sensibili ••• 
Ipsae enim species activorum in sensu actu sunt sensibilia pro-
pria." 
21 IV Sent., dist.44, q.3, a.l, sol. 3, "Alio modo aliquid recipitur 
in altero spiritualiter per modum intentionis cuiusdam sicut simili-
tudo albedinis recipitur in aere et in pupilla ••• " 
22 cf. supra P• 23 
The species by which this union takes place are the accidental 
forms of sensible objects according to a special type of existence. 
They are not forms with natural physical existence but forms with 
what st. Thomas called !!.!.! spirituale. 23 This we saw was Albert• s 
47 
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term for the mode of existence of sensible form in the sense faculty. 
But while Albert restricts this mode of existence (at least by definition) 
to forms in the faculty, Thomas uses it for the non-physical existence 
of forms in media and sense.25 This, however, is of minor importance 
because Albert gives no definition of !!!! sensibile and !!!! spirituale 
that really distinguishes the two. Both are types of ~ repreaenta-
ll!.Y!!, and as such, Thomas equates them calling both ~ spiritua.le. 
This !!!! spirituale is effected, according to St. Thomas, by a 
"spiritual change" which is the specific activity of the object in 
sensation.26 Natural change---the physical assimilation of organ or 
medium to the sensible object---may or may not accompany sensation, 
but there must always be the spiritual change if there is to be actual 
23 II de£:!!., lect. 24, " ••• (forma) in re sensibili hs.bet esse naturale, 
in sensu autem habet esse intentionale et spirituale." 
24 c£. supra PP• 22-23 
25 cf. supra P• 46, nn. 21 and 23 
26 ~· ~· I, q.78 a.3, "Est autem duplex immutatio; una naturalis, et 
alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem secundum quod forma immutantis 
recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale; sicut calor in cale-
factoa spiritualis autem, secundum quod forrra immutantis recipitur 
in immutato secundum esse spirituale, ut forma coloris in pupilla, 
quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus.requiri-
tur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilia 
fiat in organo sensus." 
sensation. If this were not so all bodies would have sensation every 
time they were physically altered. For example, a stone becoming 
warm would sense Vlarmth. 27 According to St. Thomas this immutatio 
spiritualis takes place in the medium and in the sense in some cases, 
and only in the sense in others. In sight, for instance, there is 
th . . "tual h . th d . th d" 28 1s sp1r1 c ange 1n e sense an 1n e me 1um. The same is 
true for smell. 29 Actual sound is not a quality of bodies but of air, 
so it exists physically in air and has the immutatio spiritualis only 
in the sense.30 Taste and touch have no external medium so the ~ 
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mutatio spiritualis can be ~nly in the sense. There is however a 
natural change in the sense organs of these two senses besides the 
"spiritual" change, since the hand touching something warm itself 
becomes warm and the tongue becomes moist from the moist taste. 31 
On this matter of spiritual change in sensation there is general 
27 ibid., " ••• alioquin si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad 
'58ntiendum, omnia corpora natui-alia sentirent dum alterantur." 
28 !! de An., lect. 20, " ••• immutatur medium spiritualiter {in olfac-
tu) ••• Quod autem spiritualis immutatio fit a visibili magis quam 
ab alii• ltDsibus ••• " 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid., lect. 16, "Nam in corpore sonante non est sonus, nisi in po-
tentia. In medio autem quod movetur ex percussione corporis sonan-
tis, fit sonus in actu." 
31 §.•I• I, q.78, a.3, ''Ex parte autem organi est immutatio naturalis 
in tactu et gustu; nam et manus tangens calida calefit, et lingua 
humectatur per humiditatem saporis." He explains this last, ~· 
ad 4, "Nam tactus immutatur naturali immutatione, et non solUm 
spirituali, quantum ad organum suum secundum qualitatem quae ei 
proprie objicietur; gustus autem organum non immutatur de necessi-
tate naturali immutatione secundum qualitatem quae ei proprie ei 
objicitur {ut scilicet lingua fiat dulcis, vel amara), sed secundum 
praeambulem qualitatem in qua fundatur sapor; scilicet secundum 
humorem, qui est objectum tactus." 
agreement bitween Albert and Thomas with some little disagre~ent on 
one or two minor points. When Thomas speaks of immutatio spiritualis 
in the media of sight and smell, he is saying in different words 
What we heard Albert say above, when he stated that colors and odors 
were in the air and water as in media. This mode of existence he con-
trasted to natural existence as in a ~ubject. 32 The sensibles of 
touch and taste are in their internal medium naturaliter and spiritu-
/ aliter for Thomas and as in a medium and as in a subject for Albert, 
so both agree on this. Albert and Thomas differ on sound. Thomas, 
as we have noted, says that is is in air only as in its subject, ac-
cording to !!!! naturale, whereas Albert says it has the spiritual ex-
istence as well and is in the medium as in its subject and as in a 
medium. This is of minor importance, but it is a point of definite 
disagreement. 
Since Thomas holds a species theory of sense cognition, it is 
natural that he says that the forms of sensible objects are received 
by the senses without their matter.33 On this he and Albert follow 
Aristotle.34 All three hold that the species in cognition are forms 
abstracted from the matter of sensible objects but received into the 
sense organs under the conditions of matter. 
32 cf. supra P• 35 
33 !! ~ ~., lect. 24, "Sensus est susceptivus formarum sine 
materia, sicut cera recipit signum annuli, sine ferro et auro;" 
and 2• !• I, q.84, a.2, " ••• sed cum materialibus conditionibus." 
34 cf. sspra P• 7 
49 
For Thomas the species in sense cognition are, as we mentioned 
in our last chapter, the medium quo !!! cognoscitur, not the medium 
d •t 35 ~ COgnOSC~ Ure This means that the species are not perceived in 
sensation but lead directly to a perception of the object they repre-
sent. Albert holds the same position on the nature of the species.36 
Thus far there has been almost complete agreement; the only con-
flict was on one minor point of the nature of the existence of sound 
in its medium. There are a few similar points which we shall now 
treat. A typical instance, though obviously not important, is the 
emendation St. Thomas makes of St. Albert's statement tlw.t colors are 
only potentially in the medium between the object and the eye.37 
Thomas must have noticed that color only potentiallz in the diaphanous 
medium could never actuate the species of color in the eye. He did, 
likeWise, realize with Albert that the color was not there in its 
physical actuality, for if it were the medium it would impede rather 
than help vision. Still the Angelic Doctor has no real answer for the 
difficulty so he merely tones down Albert' s"potentiallf to thisa "• •• 
iste modus essendi propter ~ imperfectionem appropinguat ad modum 
guo aliguid est in aliguo in potentia."38 The other points of differ-
erence, such as the classification of the internal senses, on which 
35 cf. supra P• 39 
36 ibid. 
37 ~· de Creat. II, q.34, a.2 (Vives XXXV, 30+), " ••• sensibile in 
medio sicut in medio, non est nisi secundum potentiam et viam et 
transitum. 
38 ~ Sensu et .sensato, lect. 5 
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Albert followed the Arabians and Thomas followed Aristotle, need not 
concern us here since they are beyond the scope of our investigation 
f al •t . t al. t• 39 o caus 1 y 1n ex ern sensa 1on. Suffice it to repeat that there 
are no major dieagreements; besides on the particular issue that con-
cerns us, causality in external sensation, the two are in perfect 
agreement. 40 
With this we conclude our treatment of St. Albert's contribution 
to the scholastic theory of external sensation. To summarize our 
findings briefly, we can say that although St. Albert did not com-
pletely free himself from the influence of Plato and Augustine, none-
theless on the question of our study he followed Aristotle faithfully. 
He clung to the Aristotelian basis of the solution and followed the 
Stagirite throughout this explanation. 
It is good for us to look on St. Thomas• synthesis as the crown 
of medieval philosophy, but we should not forget that many of' the 
jew6ls of that crown were borrowed from St. Albert the Great. Albert, 
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it is true, was never the philosophical goldsmith to cast such a crown; 
he did however, cut the brilliant facets on several of its largest gems. 
One of the jewels of this diadem whose sparkling radiance is the prod-
uct of nbert' s handiwork is the scholastic theory of causality in ex-
tarnal sensation. Let us give St. Albert full credit for this masterly 
work. 
39 For a treatment of these differences see Reilly, 20-30 
40 cf. supra P• 44 
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